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Since its inception, the U.S. legal system has evinced a meaningful
commitment to the protection of property.1 This Article explores why certain
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1. Even though the focus of this work, protection of private property from
non-governmental parties, lacks an explicit home in the Constitution, the idea of protection of
private property is central to our concept of justice. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of
Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 267, 350–52 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)
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property, specifically information technology and intellectual property (IT and
IP), is so difficult to protect when used, stolen, or pirated by a foreign entity or
individual. It is not a question of the wrongfulness of IT or IP theft. Intentional
misconduct of this type is readily condemned and subject to sanction under U.S.
law2 and the laws of most other countries as well.3 For those sanctions to
function, however, victims of such theft must have access to a robust, effective
judicial system, and the court or other enforcement agency in that system must
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
This Article focuses on the difficulty of securing personal jurisdiction (in
personam jurisdiction) over non-U.S. defendants in U.S. courts. Given the fact
that remedies for IP and IT theft are difficult to secure under the legal regimes
of many growth markets—which collectively account for the bulk of goods
available to U.S. consumers—those who steal IT and IP will not be held
accountable unless they can be brought before a U.S. court or made subject to
the authority of a U.S. state or federal agency, an unacceptable and
all-too-common occurrence with devastating social and economic
consequences.
This Article will explore the difficulties a victim of IT or IP theft faces when
attempting to hold a foreign defendant accountable in United States courts. The
Article begins by looking at the staggering costs that burden United States
entities due to IT and IP theft. It then discusses the various legal roadblocks that
prevent United States plaintiffs from exercising personal jurisdiction over
defendants in United States courts. The Article explores the various tests courts
have applied to determine whether the court has actual jurisdiction over. The
Article concludes by examining several potential solutions to the jurisdiction
problem, including state unfair trade actions, enforcement by the FTC, and
federal legislation.
(1988) (explaining that mankind came together under governments as a means to preserve their
property). Locke’s influence on the U.S. legal system is hardly controversial—Locke asserted that
protection of private property is the responsibility of government. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 17 (1985) (noting that,
consistent with John Locke’s belief that property protection is the purpose of government, the
Constitution was meant to protect private property); Cecelia M. Kenyon, Republicanism and
Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation, 19 WM. & MARY Q.
153, 172 n.13 (1962) (explaining that property was the dominant right during some periods of U.S.
history, despite its omission from the Declaration of Independence); Lynda J. Oswald, Property
Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 535 (2000) (explaining that
although John Locke stressed the preeminence of property, “[p]rotection of private property
. . . [is not an] absolute in the U.S. legal system”).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) (“unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful”).
3. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (discussing the several
countries that most recently signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which was designed
to thwart trademark and copyright theft around the world).
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I. THE COST OF IT AND IP THEFT
The value of stolen IT and IP is staggering. A recent White House study noted
that losses in 2008 alone could total as much as a trillion dollars.4 Considering
only theft of domestic IP and IT by foreign entities, a standard estimate of annual
loss is around $200 billion.5 Although assessments of actual annual losses vary,
sources estimate that between $58 billion and $1 trillion is lost each year.6 A
report by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) found that “international trade in counterfeit and pirated products could
have been up to USD 200 billion in 2005.”7 A 2011 International Trade
Commission report found that IP theft by Chinese entities alone from U.S.
companies with significant IP holdings exceeded $48 billion in 2009.8 The
International Chamber of Commerce estimates “the total magnitude of
counterfeiting and piracy worldwide . . . to be well over US$600 billion.”9
In the wake of this radical diminution of the value of IT and IP, incentives for
creativity, invention, innovation, and efficiency falter. If left unsolved, the
4. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf.
5. Neal Asbury, EU Turns Its Back on Intellectual Property Theft, MONEY NEWS (Jul. 19,
2012), http://www.moneynews.com/NealAsbury/EU-Intellectual-Property-Theft/2012/07/19/id
/445817 (stating that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative estimated total losses of
$200-$250 billion in a single year).
6. See
Intellectual
Property
Theft, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/ipr/ipr (last visited Sept. 22, 2013)
(estimating the cost at billions of dollars per year and noting that most of the theft is not domestic);
U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECON. COMM. CHAIRMAN’S STAFF, THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY THEFT ON THE ECONOMY 2 (2012), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=aa0183d4-8ad9-488f-9e38-7150a3bb62be; BUS. SOFTWARE
ALLIANCE, EIGHTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE 2010 PIRACY STUDY 1 (2011), available
at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2010/downloads/study_pdf/2010_BSA_Piracy_Study-Standard.pdf;
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY xiv (2011), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf (stating that losses attributable to Chinese
theft of IT alone exceeded $48 billion in 2009); BUS. ACTION TO STOP COUNTERFEITING AND
PIRACY, ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND
PIRACY 3 (2011), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Bascap/Global-ImpactsStudy—-Full-Report/ (placing the value of losses at $200 billion); STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR
POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY
5–9 (2007), available at http://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/the-true-cost-of-copyright-industry
-piracy-to-the-us-economy.
7. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COUNTERFEITING
AND PIRACY 4 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/38707619.pdf (estimating
that annual losses from IT and IP theft could be as high as $200 billion).
8. Press Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, U.S. Firms Report Losing Sales, Profits,
Royalties, and Brand Reputations Due to IPR Infringement in China Says USITC (May 18, 2011),
available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2011/er0518jj2.htm.
9. About, INTL’ CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy
-codes-and-rules/bascap/about (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
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problem of IT and IP theft threaten established and nascent businesses, large
publically-traded companies, and start-ups—in short, the core of the U.S.
economy. Furthermore, the theft of IT and IP perverts the marketplace,
devastating U.S. companies that respect the rule of law and are thus undercut by
those selling and using products made with stolen IT or IP.10
The notion of fair and equal treatment, in this instance making foreign entities
subject to the same rules and sanctions as domestic entities, that is, a level
playing field in the marketplace, is deeply embedded in our culture. Abraham
Lincoln famously noted that one of the goals and purposes of civil government
is, “that each [person] may have . . . an open field and a fair chance for [his]
industry, enterprise, and intelligence.”11 Achieving that “open field” and “fair
chance” in the IT and IP fields, given the prevalence of IP and IT theft, will
require aggressive judicial and regulatory action in state and federal venues.12
Unfortunately, legal problems associated with bringing those actions,
specifically the restrictive and complicated rules governing in personam
jurisdiction—the focus of this Article—stand in the way of just and appropriate
remedies. Without legal recourse, IP and IT owners lose almost incalculable
value, the entire U.S market suffers, and, over time, millions of jobs will be
lost.13
Given the magnitude of the harm caused by stolen IT and IP and deeply held
beliefs regarding fairness and equal treatment, it would be reasonable to think
that U.S. courts would be anxious to protect those harmed by overt misconduct.
But the U.S. legal system has failed to resolve the in personam jurisdiction
conundrum, and thus, has not provided a reliable mechanism to hold accountable
foreign entities that inflict tangible harms on U.S. companies and consumers
10. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 6, at 4 (“Companies that do not pay for the
programs they use to run their operations have an unfair cost advantage over companies that do,
which skews competition.”).
11. Address by Abraham Lincoln to the 166th Ohio Regiment (Aug. 22, 1864), in X
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 203 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1894).
12. Owners of IP and IT protected by U.S. copyrights cannot assert those rights beyond U.S.
borders. In other words, copyright entitlements do not extend extraterritorially, compounding the
problem of IT and IP theft outside the United States. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S.
Ct. 1351, 1355–58 (2013) (declining to provide relief to copyright holders for foreign “first sales”
followed by domestic resale of books copyrighted in the U.S.); United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C.
Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908) (deciding that the “force” of copyright laws do not extend
outside the territorial United States); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088,
1098 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (stating that copyright laws
simply do not apply to infringing acts outside the U.S.); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd.,
843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (“It is well established that copyright laws generally do not have
extraterritorial application.”); Robert Stigwood Grp. Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir.
1976) (“Copyright laws do not have extraterritorial operation.”).
13. See Intellectual Property Theft: Get Real Facts and Figures NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION
COUNCIL, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/facts-and-figures (last visited
Sept. 23, 2013) (explaining that intellectual property accounts for half of the United States’ exports,
and detailing the various costs of counterfeiting and piracy).
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through their theft of IT and IP. Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue
recently characterized the law in this area as “splintered,” noting that the
Supreme Court, rather than facilitating access to the courts, has muddled the
law.14 She further explains that the Court has announced doctrine that is “wrong,
or . . . at least misleading,” and has hit a “new low” in terms of providing a
remedial roadmap for victims of IP and IT theft.15
The jurisdictional limits over foreign entities in U.S. courts have allowed
foreign IT and IP thieves to profit with impunity.16 Commenting on the
difficulties private parties face protecting their interests, Professor John Parry
explained, “non-U.S. manufacturers who entrust their product to a [domestic]
distributor with the goal of serving the entire U.S. market will not be subject to
personal jurisdiction in every state in which their products are sold.”17 Professor
Parry further warned that foreign defendants will wantonly exploit this result.18
Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently noted that foreign producers can
“insulate themselves from suit in the United States, irrespective of the injury
caused by . . . employing . . . a Pontius Pilate-like washing of the hands via
. . . [various] distribution scheme[s].”19 In short, IT and IP theft will continue
and worsen if left unchecked and undaunted by the threat of any meaningful
legal consequences.
II. DOCTRINAL ROADBLOCKS TO SECURING JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
ENTITIES
When an entity is deprived of property, historic and basic notions of justice
require a remedy because, as a general rule, where there is a right, there is a
remedy.20 How bizarre that such a fundamental principle falters and sometimes
fails entirely when the entity engaged in the misconduct is foreign.

14. Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012).
15. Id.
16. See Andrew F. Popper, Beneficiaries of Misconduct: A Direct Approach to IT Theft, 17
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 27, 28–31 (2013); see also supra note 12 (explaining the difficulty
inherent in holding foreign IT and IP thefts accountable).
17. John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of
Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. Macintyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
827, 850 (2012).
18. Id.
19. Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call
for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies,
64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 156 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
20. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 19 (Wayne
Morrison ed., 2001) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there
is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded”); see also Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163–66 (1803) (quoting and expounding upon Blackstone’s
language).
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At a very basic level, a foreign defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a
U.S. court when there are sufficient minimum contacts to connect that entity with
the forum state and when the proceeding contemplated is fair.21 Given the harm
caused by stolen IT and IP noted in the prior section, regardless of the way one
calculates losses, the resulting damage is massive and the contact anything but
minimum. However, harm to victims has not been the common measure used
to determine whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.22
A. The Roots of In Personam Jurisdiction
For more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court has attempted to provide
guidance to lower courts on exercising in personam jurisdiction over foreign
nationals.23 Two basic requirements emerged. First, in light of the non-resident
status of the defendant, the legal proceeding contemplated must be reasonable
and fair in terms of the convenience of the forum, availability of evidence and
witnesses, and other “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”
fundamental to a fair trial.24 Second, there must be an adequate relationship or
connection between the defendant and the state, often framed in terms of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum, factored by the wisdom of asserting
jurisdiction over foreign entities, the efficiency of intended judicial action, and
respect for other legal regimes.25
U.S. courts are appropriately cautious when their actions have implications
for foreign affairs because the powers over conducting foreign affairs reside with
the executive and legislative branches of government.26 Additionally, principals

21. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101,
103, 150 (2010).
22. See infra Parts II.A-B (explaining how courts have traditionally defined personal
jurisdiction).
23. Peterson, supra note 21, at 104 (noting that “[i]n the absence of meaningful principles
established by the Supreme Court, the lower courts search for the significance of the Supreme
Court’s caselaw in snippets and phrases taken out of context and then used as the basis for the
courts’ opinions”).
24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,
76–77 (1991).
25. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (vesting the power to conduct foreign affairs in the executive);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting residual power over foreign affairs to the legislature).
Nothing in Article III of the Constitution suggests the judiciary has a role to play in foreign affairs.
Furthermore, the principles underlying the political question doctrine urge caution when cases
extend beyond U.S. borders. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that “it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance”); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (announcing that “[t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
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of comity and deference to other sovereign states are appropriate for courts to
consider.27 However, it is troubling that U.S. courts are perceived as a hostile
forum for domestic victims of misconduct by foreign entities. The unavailability
of a forum for an injured plaintiff to seek a remedy in has serious
consequences.28 The notion that the courthouse doors are closed can lead to the
degradation of clearly articulated rights, particularly in the intellectual property
field.29
The starting point for discussing in personam jurisdiction is Pennoyer v.
Neff.30 Pennoyer limited a state’s power to “extend its process beyond” its
borders,31 holding that a court cannot assert in personam jurisdiction over a
foreign entity unless there is a sufficient and meaningful relationship between
the entity and the forum state, most easily established by personal service or
actual presence.32 In International Shoe v. Washington, decided more than a
half century later, the Court held that states could extend their reach beyond their
borders to out-of-state parties so long as there are “certain minimum contacts”
between the party and the forum state,33 as opposed to the actual presence or
service of process required in Pennoyer.34 The question after International Shoe
became assessing the fairness of the contemplated proceeding and the nature of
the defendants’ contacts, both from a quantitative (how much value, money,
impact, investment, etc.) and qualitative (of what type, legal interest, reliance,
benefit from the forum state, etc.) perspective.35

Executive and Legislative . . . Departments of the Government . . . not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision”).
27. See Philips Med. Sys. Int’l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993) (defining
comity in terms of the respect foreign nations owe each other); Paul supra note 24, at 3–4
(explaining that comity embraces notions of reciprocity and goodwill between sovereign nations).
28. Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 720 (2010) (“[A] legal
regime that does not guarantee to all individuals that their claims of injustice will be heard sends a
message of disrespect and reinforces their sense of unworthiness. As a consequence, the unequal
access to justice yields a loss of legitimacy for the entire civil justice system and diminishes the
acceptability of its adjudicative outcomes”).
29. Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV 43, 61–62 (2010) (discussing forum selection difficulties imposed on alleged
infringers seeking relief in patent suits by a Federal Circuit rule stating that patent holders are not
subject to personal jurisdiction in the federal court of an alleged infringer’s home state).
30. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
31. 95 U.S. at 722.
32. See id. at 722–24.
33. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
34. Id. at 319–20.
35. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–79 (1985) (listing various factors
courts should consider in determining whether a defendant’s contacts are sufficient to properly
bring it within the forum state’s jurisdiction).
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In the wake of International Shoe, two tracks for in personam jurisdiction
emerged: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.36 If a foreign entity has
“substantial, continuous, and systematic” contacts with the forum state,37 a court
can exercise general jurisdiction over that entity.38 General jurisdiction requires
a level of contact with a forum state that approximates physical presence.39 A
foreign entity with contacts sufficient for general jurisdiction is fully subject to
the laws of that state, much the same as an entity or individual domiciled in that
state.40 Evidence of contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction includes
maintaining a business facility or office within the state, holding a license from
the state, employing sales agents in the state, advertising or promotion targeting
the state, solicitation of business within the state, or engaging in other acts that
evince long-term presence in the forum state.41
If the contacts are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction, a court may
still exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant.42 Specific jurisdiction exists
when contacts, although not substantial, continuous, and systematic, nonetheless
reflect a conscious transactional engagement in the forum state43 coupled with a

36. See Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 473 n.15 (contrasting general and specific
jurisdiction); International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (discussing how a entity can confer in person
jurisdiction, although not in terms of specific and general jurisdiction); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (defining general and specific jurisdiction).
37. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006); Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471–73; Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414–19 (1984); Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989). The
requirement that an entity have substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the forum
state is not without criticism. See Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of
Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012) (arguing that the standard is insufficient,
and challenging the validity of “doing business” as a meaningful basis for jurisdiction); Harold G.
Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 280 (1991) (challenging the legitimacy of general jurisdiction as a violation
of the Due Process Clause).
38. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415; Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205.
39. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).
40. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
41. Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086.
42. The Supreme Court recently explained the distinction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown:
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
[defendants] . . . when their affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic”
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. . . . Specific jurisdiction . . .
depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,”
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum
State. . . . [S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of “issues deriving from, or
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (citations omitted).
43. See Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1992); N. Penn Gas
Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 690 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1990); Marvel Worldwide,
Inc. v. Kirby, 2010 WL 1655253, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010).
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purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the state.44 Specific
jurisdiction is transactional, case-specific, and unpredictable.45 A set of targeted
sales that are part of a marketing strategy, advertising, or other direct and specific
relationships coupled with purposeful availment would probably be sufficient.46
For those seeking redress for U.S.-based harms caused by foreign IP and IT
theft, specific jurisdiction cases potentially pose a significant challenge. If a
foreign entity has “set up shop” in the forum state (by having a place of business,
employees, and localized marketing) and has a long-term, on-going business in
that state, it is likely that the entity is subject to general jurisdiction and can be
held accountable in court much like any resident of the state.47 In contrast, when
products made abroad using stolen IT or IP “appear” in a state and are sold by
others, the challenge for victims is to show that the sale or use of the product is
not an incidental or sporadic transaction that would fall outside of the
requirements for specific jurisdiction.48
The questions specific jurisdiction present are challenging, particularly for
transactions that do not involve extensive contacts, multiple sales, or long-term
transactions. In McGee v. International Life Insurance, the Court found that a
single sale or contact could be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction if the
suit arises from that sale or contact.49 The Court clarified McGee a few months
after it was decided in Hanson v. Denckla.50 The Hanson decision shifted the
focus of the personal jurisdiction inquiry from the notion of a single sale or
transaction to the more demanding International Shoe standard that centers on
fairness, minimum contacts, and purposeful availment of the legal regime of the
state.51 The Hanson Court held that the plaintiff must show that “the defendant

44. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112–13 (1987) (plurality opinion); Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware
GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal of the case for lack
of personal jurisdiction because the defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of
doing business in Texas); Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D.
Md. 2004) (concluding that the court had no personal jurisdiction over a website operator that sold
products on two occasions to residents of the forum state because web interactivity and two isolated
sales did not rise to the level of purposeful availment).
45. See LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [the Federal Circuit] has outlined a specific test to
follow when analyzing whether a defendant’s activities within a state are ‘continuous and
systematic.’ Instead, a court must look at the facts of each case to make such a determination.”).
46. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112–13.
47. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for general
jurisdiction).
48. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for specific
jurisdiction).
49. 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
50. Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
51. Id.
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purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”52
Twenty years later, the Court refined Hanson, first in Shaffer v. Heitner,
requiring that the defendant’s presence or contacts be sufficient to meet the due
process fair play and reasonability requirements;53 and second, in Kulko v.
Superior Court, reiterating the minimum contacts test and discussing how the
interests of the plaintiff and the state are factored into the inquiry.54 In cases of
IT or IP theft, to assert specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant “‘purposely directed’ his activities at residents of the forum . . . and
the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those
activities.”55 The conduct should be sufficient such that foreign national[s]
should “reasonably anticipate being haled into court.”56 These requirements
suggest that the conscious marketing choices and expectations of the
defendant—the nature of the defendant’s action—not the harm to the plaintiff,
are the central considerations in determining whether a court can assert
personam jurisdiction over a defendant.
B. Asahi and Nicastro: The Plot Thickens
In 1987, the question of the nature of the sufficiency of a defendant’s actions
or contact with the forum for purposes of in personam jurisdiction came to a
head in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court.57 In Asahi, the
plaintiff’s wife was killed when a motorcycle they were riding collided with a
tractor.58 The accident occurred in California and allegedly was caused by a
defect in one of the motorcycle’s tires as well as a defect in the valve in that
tire.59 The tire was made by Cheng Shin Rubber, a Taiwanese company, and the
valve was made by Asahi Metal Industry Co, Ltd., a Japanese company.60
About twenty percent of Cheng Shin’s U.S. sales were in California, and
although there was some disagreement on the issue between the parties, it is safe
to conclude that a meaningful number of Cheng Shin tires sold in California had
Asahi valves.61 Cheng Shin then filed a cross-claim against Asahi in California
seeking indemnification.62 Before judgment, the plaintiff settled with Cheng
52. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
53. 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
54. 436 U.S. 84, 91–92 (1978).
55. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
56. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
57. 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 105–06.
60. Id. at 106.
61. Id. at 106–07.
62. Id.
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Shin Rubber and the various other defendants, leaving only the indemnity suit.63
Cheng Shin asserted that the court had in personam jurisdiction over Asahi based
on the fact that Asahi could foresee the presence of its products in California and
was unquestionably aware that a meaningful number of its valves would be
incorporated into tires sold in California.64
Asahi argued that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts
because it never contemplated being sued in the U.S., had no employees, offices,
or real estate in California, and because it did not make direct sales or solicit
business in California.65
Based on these facts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and asked
whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the
components it manufactured . . . would reach the forum State [and
enter] the stream of commerce constitutes “minimum contacts”
between the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of
jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”66
The Court found that even if one assumes Asahi was aware that Cheng Shin
products containing Asahi valves were sold in California, and even if the
products were, broadly defined, in the stream of commerce, Asahi did not
“purposefully avail itself of the California market. . . . It did not create, control,
or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to California.”67
Consequently, the Court found that Asahi had insufficient contacts to satisfy the
Due Process minimum contact rules.68
On the question of fairness and substantial justice, the Court noted that
because the defendant Asahi was a foreign company (raising problems of
convenience and witness availability) and because the plaintiff, Cheng Chin was
not a California resident, the interest of the forum state was limited.69 This is an
important consideration for IT and IP theft cases and suggests that an action
against a foreign entity brought by a state resident or the state Attorney General
on behalf of the state might be treated differently than an action brought by a
non-resident. As discussed later in this Article, a state court has a powerful
interest in hearing claims brought by the state on behalf of its residents.70 The
Asahi Court made this distinction clear, explaining that when there are minimum
contacts and the plaintiff is a state resident (or is the state itself), “the exercise

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 107–08.
See id.
Id. at 105 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 113–14.
See infra text accompanying notes 241–245.
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of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien
defendant.”71
In reaching its decision regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants, the
Court noted concerns about fairness, convenience, and international relations.72
The Court cautioned that “‘[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when
extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.’”73
Nowhere in the Asahi opinion does the Court suggest that similar care should be
given to protecting the rights and entitlements of domestic victims of wrongful
conduct.
It is unclear whether the Court intended to rewrite the requirements for in
personam jurisdiction in Asahi, an atypical case involving a component-part
third-party indemnification dispute between an out-of-state entity and an
out-of-the-United States entity. This was not a case involving the rights of an
in-state plaintiff harmed by the acts of a foreign defendant. Though written by
a divided court,74 Asahi initiated a jurisprudential mudslide, dividing both
federal circuits and state courts.75 A decade and a half later, the rifts in Asahi

71. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
72. See id. at 114–15.
73. Id. at 116 (citing United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
74. In fact, Asahi is hardly as crisp legal precedent or a clear determination of the law. The
case generated three opinions, and only the first part of the first opinion, written by Justice
O’Connor, was joined by a majority of the Court. In the remainder of her plurality opinion, Justice
O’Connor was joined by only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia. Id. Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred separately in a second opinion, and Justice
Stevens, White, and Blackmun wrote a third opinion. Id. at 116, 121.
75. Asahi (and its many interpretations) has been cited to thousands of times by state and
federal courts and is the subject of countless law review articles. See, e.g., Rodger D. Citron, The
Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens,
88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433 (2011); Diane S. Kaplan, Paddling up the Wrong Stream: Why the
Stream of Commerce Theory is Not Part of the Minimum Contacts Doctrine, 55 BAYLOR L. REV.
503 (2003); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202 (2011); Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn’t Know Its Asahi from Its
Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 875 (1990); Linda J. Silberman, “Two Cheers” for International Shoe (and
None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 755 (1995); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729 (1988); Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining
the Due Process Contours of General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Manufacturers, 11 J. INT’L BUS.
& L. 49 (2012); Christine M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadel: The Advent of Jurisdictional
Privity, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 424–37 (1993) (criticizing Asahi.); Earl M. Maltz, Comment,
Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669 (1987); Kristianna L. Sciarra,
Note, A Gap in Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning: An Analysis of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 195 (2013).
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were still present in the Court, as evident in the Court’s more recent Nicastro76
and Goodyear77 decisions.
However one reads Asahi, the case reflects the Court’s abundant concern for
foreign defendants and leaves domestic plaintiffs with an uncertain burden. In
her plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor’s concluded that “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum state” such that the court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.78 In a separate opinion, Justice
Brennan disagreed, accepting the argument that the knowing and foreseeable
placement of a product in the stream of commerce is sufficient for the purposes
of establishing in personam jurisdiction.79 Justice O’Connor’s perspective could
make it difficult for victims of foreign IP or IT theft to “hale” into court a foreign
defendant who merely uses or sells, on their own or through domestic retailers,
goods made with stolen IT or IP.80 Justice Brennan’s perspective makes
bringing such cases more feasible—but his opinion was not endorsed by a
majority of the Court.81 As the next section indicates, the split between these
two points of view persists.
In 2011, the Court decided J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a case
that raised many of the questions posed and only partially answered in Asahi.82
During the course of his employment, plaintiff Robert Nicastro, a New Jersey
resident, sustained permanent disabling injuries to his hand while using a
machine manufactured by the British company, J. McIntyre Machinery.83 The
machine was imported into the United States by an Ohio company and then sold
to Nicastro’s employer.84 J. McIntyre Machinery sold four machines that ended
up in New Jersey, sent representatives to U.S. trade shows, held U.S. patents on
some of its products, and, through a U.S. distributor, advertised its products in
the United States.85 In short, the machines were intended for use in the United
States and had entered the U.S. stream of commerce.86
A plurality of the Court held that although the defendant directed activities at
and benefited from U.S. commerce, it had not purposefully availed itself of New

76. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion);
see also infra notes 82–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicastro decision).
77. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011).
78. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
79. Id. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. See id. at 115–16.
81. See id. at 116–17.
82. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 2786.
84. Id. at 2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2786.
86. See id.
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Jersey law by directing conduct specifically at the state.87 Even if the goods
were in the state’s stream of commerce, the plurality explained that a defendant
must both target the forum state and purposely avail itself of the rights and
protections of that state.88 In other words, a defendant’s actions in seeking the
protection of the forum or using its laws was the proper measure of the
sufficiency of the contacts with the state, not the foreseeable presence of their
products.89
Although Nicastro could have clarified the confusion left by Asahi, the Court
was unable to make a clear statement of the law to guide future courts. The case
was decided by a plurality and rejected (to the extent a plurality can be
dispositive90) the idea that a foreseeable sale in a state on its own is sufficient
for in personam jurisdiction.91 When a defendant’s product is merely in the
stream of commerce and is foreseeably made available for sale in the forum
state, the Nicastro plurality opinion dictates that there is insufficient contact for
purposes of specific or general jurisdiction.92
Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Nicastro that although the foreign
“[m]anufacturer permitted, indeed wanted, its independent American Distributor
to sell its machines to anyone in America willing to buy them,” it was unfair to
hale the defendant into court without more extensive contacts with the forum
state.93 Justice Breyer also expressed concern for small foreign defendants who
cause injury to persons in the United States, stating that it is “unfair” to hold
these defendants accountable in court because of the burden of requiring foreign
entities “to understand not only the tort law of every State, but also the wide
variance in the way courts within different States apply that law.”94 Concern
over fairness for foreign defendants dominates the Court’s opinions on personal
jurisdiction matters95—but the court does not appear to express equal concern
for domestic victims of misconduct. It should not be so difficult to protect
87. Id. at 2790–91 (explaining that the defendant did not engage in activity in New Jersey
“that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws” and therefore is not subject
to in personam jurisdiction in that state).
88. See id. at 2788 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
89. See id. at 2788–89.
90. See Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential
Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419 (1992); John F. Davis & William
L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62
(1974).
91. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788–89.
92. See id. at 2789.
93. Id. at 2791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 2794.
95. GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850–51, 2853 (2011); Nicastro, 131 S.
Ct. at 2789–90)) (explaining that the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have repeatedly allowed
foreign corporations to challenge the personal jurisdiction claims using “the full measure of due
process protections”).
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interests that are so fundamental—specifically interests in IP or IT created by a
U.S. entity or person.
III. MISCONDUCT, MINIMUM CONTACTS, AND MAXIMUM CONFUSION
As just discussed, there is abundant precedent detailing when courts are
prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over foreign defendants. But do clear
and uniform criteria exist to indicate when it is permissible for a court to protect
the interests of those victimized by foreign entities and individuals?
There is logic to the notion that a product that is foreseeably present in the
United States and designed for domestic sales should be sufficient to establish
in personam jurisdiction over a foreign user or seller. However, the plurality in
Nicastro noted that a single transaction or isolated sale of a product is
insufficient to support jurisdiction—even if the presence of the product in the
forum state is foreseeable.96 Instead, a regular flow of goods in a particular
jurisdiction must be coupled with actions demonstrating that the seller or
manufacturer availed themselves of the market opportunities and the rights and
protections of the legal system in the forum state.97 Justice Breyer’s concurrence
in Nicastro also suggests that the importance of evidence indicating a “specific
effort” by the defendant to sell its product in the forum state, such as lists of
potential customers in the forum state or advertising or marketing in the forum
state.98 Foreign manufacturers that steal IP and IT and then sell their products
through U.S. wholesalers and retailers often will have little need for the indicia
of state contacts suggested by both the Nicastro plurality and Justice Breyer in
his concurrence.
A. Domestic Subsidiaries
Given the profitability of IT or IP theft and the difficulties associated with
establishing in personam jurisdiction over foreign defendants, it is worth asking
whether the minimum contacts problem might be solved when the seller or user
in the forum state is a subsidiary of a foreign parent company.99 If the subsidiary
is owned and fully controlled by the foreign parent company, the chances of

96. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 2792.
99. See Am. Tel. & Tel Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a foreign parent corporation’s relationship with its domestic subsidiary was
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159,
1161 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a foreign corporation did not fall within the reach of the Texas
long-arm statute because, as a parent company, it did not have enough control over its domestic
subsidiary to establish personal jurisdiction); Boryk v. De Havilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666,
668 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction, under New York
law it is immaterial whether the parent corporation or the subsidiary engaged in the activities at
issue).
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hauling the parent into a U.S. court increases.100 But it is insufficient to rely on
the subsidiary’s contact with the forum state to reach the parent company for
personal jurisdiction purposes, regardless of how the corporate relationship
between the parent and subsidiary is structured.101 For example, in Hargrave v.
Fiberboard Corp., the court explained that: “[g]enerally, a foreign parent
corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its
subsidiary is present or doing business there; the mere existence of a parentsubsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction
over the foreign parent.”102 Instead, to establish personal jurisdiction over the
parent company, the parent must exert “such domination and control over its
subsidiary ‘that they do not in reality constitute separate and distinct corporate
entities but are one and the same corporation for purposes of jurisdiction.’”103
The problem, of course, is that foreign entities that engage in IT theft or use
stolen IT in the production of goods are probably smart enough to keep their
subsidiaries separate, or to use independent sellers within the United States with
whom they do not have formal long-term corporate ownership relationships. In
Hargrave, the court found that a domestic company can be construed as a
dependent subsidiary based on the amount of the subsidiary’s stock the parent
controls and the extent to which the parent and subsidiary share headquarters,
officers, directors, corporate formalities, accounting systems, and overall
authority for the day-to-day operation of the subsidiary.104 From a broad
perspective, it is unclear how many parties involved in IT and IP theft cases
would meet that test.
B. Non-Affiliated Users or Sellers
Beyond the parent-subsidiary relationship, the rules begin to blur, and depend
largely on the state and the circumstances. Illinois, for example, has adopted a
fairly broad (and somewhat unique) interpretation of the elemental fairness
requirement of personam jurisdiction.105 Recently that standard was set out in
Russell v. SNFA:
To determine reasonableness, courts consider the following factors:
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in
resolving the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4)
the interest of the affected forums, including the forum state, in the

100. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 n.22 (1985).
101. See Am. Tel. & Tel Co., 94 F.3d at 590; Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159.
102. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159.
103. Id. (quoting 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 4.25[6], 4-273 (2d
ed. 1982)).
104. See id. at 1160–61.
105. See Russell v. SNFA, 946 N.E.2d 1076, 1085 (Ill App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 987 N.E.2d 778
(Ill. 2013).
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most efficient resolution of the dispute; and (5) the interest of the
affected forums in the advancement of substantive social policies.106
The Russell case involved the deadly crash of an Agusta helicopter in 2003.
The helicopter, which ultimately ended up in Illinois where the crash occurred,
was built in Italy with French parts and exported to the United States through a
German company.107 The court found it noteworthy that the defendant SNFA
did not disclaim knowledge of Agusta helicopters sales in the United States or
Agusta’s American subsidiary that distributed helicopters in the United
States.108 Relying on the reasonable foreseeability of the presence of the
product—thus following Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce test outlined in
Asahi—the Illinois court concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over the
foreign defendants was proper.109 The Court did not discuss whether the
defendant knowingly accessed the legal system of the state or contemplated and
planned to benefit from that system, thus diluting the importance of purposeful
availment emphasized by Nicastro. Unfortunately, Russell is the exception, not
the rule.110
In Willemsen v. Invacare Corp.,a post-Nicastro opinion from Oregon, the
plaintiffs’ mother was killed in a fire allegedly caused by a defect in the battery
charger of her motorized wheelchair.111 Plaintiffs were residents of Oregon.112
Invacare built the wheelchair at its Ohio plant and the wheelchair’s battery
charger was manufactured by CTE, a Taiwanese company.113 CTE made its
battery chargers in accordance with contract specifications set by Invacare and
agreed to indemnify Invacare for liability resulting from problems with the
chargers.114 CTE disputed the finding of personal jurisdiction, claiming that it
has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in
Oregon.115 CTE reasoned that Invacare targeted Oregon; thus under Nicastro,
the possibility that CTE could have foreseen that its battery chargers may be sold
or used in Oregon is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Oregon
courts.116
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1079.
108. Id. at 1085.
109. Id. at 1087; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116–17
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. See Greg Saetrum, Note, Righting the Ship: Implications of J. McIntyre v. Nicastro and
How to Navigate the Stream of Commerce in Its Wake, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 499, 505, 507 (2013)
(quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion))
(noting that courts tend to rely on Justice O’Connor’s test more than Justice Brennan’s because
Brennan’s test is less stringent and is inconsistent with the proper exercise of judicial power).
111. 282 P.3d 867, 870 (Or. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 984 (2013).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 869–70.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 871.
116. Id. at 872.
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The Oregon court disagreed with CTE, suggesting that neither Asahi nor
Nicastro provided a clear answer to critical personal jurisdiction questions.117
The court stated that “[w]hen . . . ‘a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the narrowest grounds.’”118 Freed from
strictures of the Nicastro plurality opinion, the court found that CTE had
minimum contacts with Oregon such that CTE has purposefully availed itself of
Oregon law.119 The court reasoned that CTE’s large number of sales to Invacare
and the indemnification agreement between the companies suggested that CTE
anticipated a role in potential legal proceedings.120 The court looked to Justice
Breyer’s concurring opinion in Nicastro, which explained that “without
evidence of a ‘regular . . . flow or a regular course of sales’ in [the forum state]
. . . was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the out-of-statedefendant,” and found that CTE’s pattern of sales demonstrated a “regular flow
or regular course of sales in Oregon.”121 The court found such activities can
form a foundation for specific jurisdiction because under these circumstances, a
foreign defendant could “anticipate[] the need to defend against the very sort of
claim that the plaintiffs [filed in this case].”122 In sum, the Willemsen court held
that it “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” to
exert jurisdiction over a foreign company that benefits from sales in a state,
foresees those sales, and therefore, anticipates the potential for liability from
those sales.123
Foreseeability of presence, although a logical factor to consider, has not
traditionally defined the personal jurisdiction analysis.124 Outside of cases like
Russell or Willemsen or those cases involving subsidiary relationships that meet
the criteria mentioned above, victims of IT or IP theft are left with the
uncertainty of Asahi and the negative implications of the Nicastro plurality.125
If the most that can be said about items designed for sale in the United States
and produced abroad using stolen IP or IT is that they are foreseeably present in
117. Id. at 875–76.
118. Id. at 873 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
119. Id. at 875.
120. Id. at 877.
121. Id. at 873–74 (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791–92
(2011) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. See id. at 877.
123. Id.
124. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (“Yet
‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause.”).
125. See Popper supra note 16, at 46 (discussing the implications of Asahi and Nicastro on
determining personal jurisdiction for foreign defendants in the IT or IP industries); see also infra
text accompanying notes 134–155).
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a forum state, then in personam jurisdiction is unlikely to be found. Per Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi, foreseeable presence, without more, is
insufficient to establish the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.126
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion has generated a quarter century of debate
and pronounced conflict among the circuits.127 As Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
opinion in Nicastro points out, the post-Asahi measures of in personam
jurisdiction leave something to be desired.128 Not least of all, the plurality’s use
of the value of sales, selling price, and the volume of sales as measures of the
sufficiency of contacts129 creates a troubling means of quantifying or qualifying
a defendant’s contacts with a forum, especially considering other contact
measures, such as marketing strategies, number of employees, presence of
property, advertising, and access to or benefits from the legal system of the state,
which have nothing to do with the selling price of a product.130 Justice Ginsburg
noted that “[b]y dollar value, the price of a single machine represents a
significant sale. Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of
flannel
shirts—as
in
Nelson
v.
Park
Industries—cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court would presumably
find the defendant amenable to suit in that State.”131 As alluded to by Justice
126. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion).
127. Choice Healthcare Inc. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plans, 615 F.3d 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2010)
(noting that the circuits differ over whether to follow Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s
approach); see Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion,
and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV.
681, 681, 703–04 (2009).
128. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
129. Id. at 2786, 2790 (plurality opinion) (highlighting the fact that only four of the defendant’s
machines ended up in the forum state).
130. See id. at 2803 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As the Asahi court explained, “designing
the product for the market in the forum States, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State” are all means of
demonstrating purposeful availment of the forum state’s market. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
131. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 n.15 (internal citations omitted). In Nelson v. Park Industries,
Inc., the Seventh Circuit, sitting in diversity, found that the court could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer and distributor under Wisconsin law because the
manufacturer and distributor of flannel shirts were aware that they had indirectly served and
economically benefited from a national distribution scheme established by their secondary
distributor, which distributed thousands of flannel shirts nation-wide. 717 F.2d 1120, 1126–27 (7th
Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., holding that
the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Japanese cigarette lighter manufacturer of
under Texas law that distributed millions of cigarette lighters nationwide indirectly though an
exclusive distributor. 616 F.2d 191, 197–98 (5th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit also reached a
similar conclusion in Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., holding that the court could exert personal
jurisdiction over a foreign wire-rope splice manufacturer under Oregon law because the
manufacturer was aware that it put over 300,000 splices annually into the foreign stream of
commerce for ships that could end up at Oregon ports. 715 F.2d 1355, 1357–58 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Ginsburg, the plurality’s approach is hardly rational because it translated
availment of the benefits from a forum state’s market into measuring “targeting”
a forum state by bulk sales and price.
Courts have given varied answers to the question of whether stream of
commerce, foreseeable presence, or something more is required. Professor
Angela Laughlin recently studied the variation—or more accurately,
disagreement—between the circuits on the issue.132 Based on her research, she
concluded that five circuits follow Justice O’Connor’s approach, three circuits
follow Justice Brennan’s approach, and three circuits have declined to decide
the issue.133 For victims of IT or IP theft, this discord generated by Asahi and
Nicastro adds to the instability in the field and suggests that conventional
protection of property rights is unavailable or unreliable in Article III courts.
Much of the controversy generated by Asahi involves disagreements about the
importance of a defendant’s knowing placement of a product into the forum
state’s stream of commerce.134 The problem in Justice O’Connor’s plurality
opinion is not one of clarity. Instead, it is the implication that is troubling. Under
Justice O’Connor’s formulation, deciding to sell goods in the forum state, and
then carrying out that intention by selling those goods in the state is not sufficient
to make a company or a seller subject to the laws of that state.135
Justice Brennan’s view in Asahi differs fundamentally on the meaning of
stream of commerce. Under his formulation, deciding to sell goods in the forum
state, and then selling those goods in the state probably is sufficient to establish
in personam jurisdiction over the entity or individual.136 The problem, however,
is that this formulation is outright rejected by the plurality in Nicastro.137

132. See Laughlin, supra note 127, at 681 (2009).
133. Id. at 703–04, app. at 727–28. Specifically, the First Circuit follows Justice O’Connor,
the Second Circuit is inconclusive, the Third Circuit is inconclusive, the Fourth Circuit follows
Justice O’Connor, the Fifth Circuit follows Justice Brennan (with some qualifications), the Sixth
Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Seventh Circuit appears to follow Justice Brennan, the Eight
Circuit follows Brennan (although some of the lower courts appear to follow O’Connor), the Ninth
Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Tenth Circuit is inconclusive, the Eleventh Circuit follows
Justice O’Connor, and the Federal Circuit has declined to decide the question. Id.
134. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786, 2788 (plurality opinion) (noting that the court’s decision
“may be responsible in part for [the New Jersey Supreme Court’s] error regarding the stream of
commerce” analysis); see also Sciarra, supra note 75, at 200 (discussing the effect of the Asahi
court’s split decision on the stream of commerce analysis in post-Asahi cases).
135. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).
136. See id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[S]tream of commerce refers . . . to the regular
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”).
137. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“But Justice Brennan’s concurrence,
advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the
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Although the dissent in Nicastro considered Brennan to be on the right
track,138 as of today, no track is apparent. This dissonance enables courts, if they
choose, to chart their own path on the question of in personam jurisdiction.139
For example, a New Mexico court chose to follow its own precedents until the
Supreme Court resolves whether stream of commerce theory is applicable.140 A
federal court in Georgia has taken a similar approach; after noting the dispute in
the Court over whether stream of commerce theory is valid, the Georgia court
explained that under federal circuit precedent the theory could, at best,
questionably support general jurisdiction and did not support specific
jurisdiction in a patent infringement case unless there was evidence of
enforcement activity.141
Before Nicastro, courts had begun to use the Brennan stream of commerce
test more liberally.142 But since Nicastro was decided, courts have been less
inclined to follow the Brennan test.143 For example, in Dow Chemical Canada
v. Superior Court the court adopted an O’Connor-like view of purposeful
availment and activities targeted toward the forum state and concluded that
denied in personam jurisdiction could not be asserted, notwithstanding the

premises of lawful judicial power. This Court’s precedents make clear that it is the defendant’s
actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”).
138. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139. See, e.g., Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 304 P.3d 18, 33 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012); Atlantis
Hydroponics v. Int’l Growers Supply, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
140. Sproul, 304 P.3d at 33 (“Because [Nicastro] did not produce a majority opinion adopting
either Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce theory . . . [we] adhere to our
[in-state] precedents, at least until the United States Supreme Court resolves the twenty-five-yearold uncertainty over whether stream of commerce theory is sufficient to establish the required
minimum contacts and, if so, how it should be applied.”).
141. Atlantis Hydroponics, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–79 (evaluating a declaratory judgment
request in a patent infringement dispute between two hydroponics supply companies).
142. See, e.g., Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 612–13,
615 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the stream of commerce theory to find personal jurisdiction hen the
manufacturer knew its products were entering the forum state via its distribution network and had
benefited from the distribution); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 376
(8th Cir. 1990) (declining to find personal jurisdiction over a defendant when there was no evidence
of minimum contacts or distribution-related knowledge on behalf of the defendant); Vang v.
Whitby Tool & Eng’g Co., 484 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973 (D. Minn. 2007) (finding personal jurisdiction
over a company that was neither licensed nor had agents or property in the state, but that sold its
product within the forum state through a distributor, and thus was aware that the product would be
used in the forum state).
143. See AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(finding a lack of personal jurisdiction and acknowledging that Nicastro was not definitive on the
efficacy of the stream of commerce theory); Sieg v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 2d 320,
324 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (ruling that exercising personal jurisdiction over the third party defendant
would constitute an overly broad exercise of the stream of commerce rule). But see Original
Creations, Inc. v. Ready Am., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (concluding that
because the Nicastro plurality “[did] not discard the stream of commerce theory,” courts are free to
follow the law of their forum or circuit and apply the stream of commerce test).
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foreseeable presence of the defendant’s product in the forum state.144 In Van
Heeswyk v. Jabiru Aircraft, the court applied Nicastro, and concluded that the
mere fact that it was “predictable” that the defendant’s product would end up in
the forum state was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.145 The court
noted that there was a distinct difference between the predictability or
foreseeability that the defendant’s goods would be sold in the state and those
instances where the defendant “can be said to have targeted the forum.”146
Whether foreign manufacturers that produce goods made with or using stolen IT
or IP target a particular state will be difficult to predict in many, if not most,
cases.
Although it seems only fair that victims should be able to bring a claim in any
state where they have been adversely affected, the targeting requirement remains
an obstacle to holding thieves accountability.147 In Oticon v. Sebotek Hearing
Systems, LLC, the federal court, interpreting both New Jersey and Supreme
Court jurisprudence, found that although “Nicastro does not clearly or
conclusively define the breadth and scope of the stream of commerce theory . .
. Nicastro stands for the proposition that targeting the national market is not
enough to impute jurisdiction to all the forum States.”148 In short, Nicastro has
left litigants in a state of confusion regarding the appropriate analysis to apply
when determining questions of personal jurisdiction, especially in cases of

144. See 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that mere awareness of the
defendant’s product finding its way into the forum state, a single sale, or even a number of sales
within a state would be insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in the absence of targeting,
purposeful availment, or sustained and continuous contact), cert. denied, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 4535
(Cal. 2012), 133 S. Ct. 427 (2012).
145. 276 P.3d 46, 52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788).
146. Id. (quoting Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788).
147. The Federal Circuit, echoing the plurality in Nicastro, has not formulated its own
standards to be more accommodating to those who seek to protect copyrighted material or IP or IT
that is otherwise protected by the government. The Federal Circuit requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant purposefully availed themselves of the protections and benefits of
the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. See Bluestone Innovations Tex. v. Formosa Epitaxy, 822 F. Supp. 2d 657,
660 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Int’l Shoe 326 U.S. at 316–20; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462);
Emissive Energy v. SPA Simrad, 788 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43–44 (D.R.I. 2011); Avocent Huntsville
Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Breckenridge Pharm., Inc.
v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006); LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell
Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Akro v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1544–45
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
148. 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 513 (D.N.J. 2011).
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foreign defendants.149 The Supreme Court does not seem inclined to lift the fog
and clear the air.150
IV. CALDER AND THE EFFECT OF INTENTIONALITY ON IN PERSONAM
JURISDICTION
A different way of thinking about the problem explained above is to consider
it in terms of the underlying substantive act: theft, which is an intentional act of
misconduct. IP and IT theft, as intentional acts causing harm are not in the same
category as negligent acts and thus, are subject to a different jurisdictional
calculus.151 The Nicastro plurality opinion recognized this distinction and
explained that “in some cases, as with an intentional tort, the defendant might
well fall within the state’s authority by reason of his attempt to obstruct its
laws.”152 The Nicastro plurality’s reference to Calder-like reasoning153 raises a
fundamental question: because theft of IT or IP is an intentional act, what would
prevent a court from using “Calder-effect” jurisdiction as a basis to exert in
personam jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer using stolen IT whose
products are exported to and sold in the United States?

149. One commentator notes that Nicastro “left long-standing questions about personal
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers foggy.” Greg Ryan, High Court Leaves Liability
Jurisdiction Foggy for Foreign Cos., LAW 360 (Oct. 9, 2012, 10:24 PM),
www.law360.com/articles/385022/-high-court-leaves-liability-jurisdiction-foggy-for-foreign-cos.
There is one alternative mode of analysis based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(K)(2), which
provides that a federal court can establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant “[i]f the exercise
of jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States,
serving a summons or filing a wavier of service is also effective. . . to establish personal jurisdiction
over the person of any defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general
jurisdiction.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). For this provision to apply, “the plaintiff’s claim must arise
under federal law, the defendant must not be subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general
jurisdiction, and exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process.” Touchcom, Inc. v.
Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that “Rule 4(k)(2) was adopted
to ensure that federal claims will have a U.S. forum if sufficient national contacts exist”). Another,
perhaps more important, for IP and IT cases depends on whether there is a more convenient forum
for resolution of the claim in the United States or abroad. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435–36 (2007) (finding that because the contacts, parties, and the
initial legal dispute were more conveniently heard in China, the case should be dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds, leaving the question of personal jurisdiction unanswered).
150. See Ryan, supra note 159 (stating that “Supreme Court clarification may be slow to
arrive” because Justice Breyer does not want to reinterpret jurisdictional rules “until presented with
a case involving ‘modern concerns’ such as e-commerce”).
151. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 480 (La. 1981) (quoting O. W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 3 (1881)) (“Universally, harmful conduct is considered more reprehensible if
intentional. . . . ‘Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.’”).
152. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion).
153. See id.; cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (holding that the court had
personal jurisdiction when intentional conduct, performed outside of the forum state but directed
towards the state, allegedly caused tortious injury in the forum state).
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A. The Calder Doctrine
Calder-effect jurisdiction permits courts to provide a remedy for acts of
intentional misconduct where the jurisdictional focus is primarily on the act
performed outside of the forum state that causes harm within the forum state,
rather than on the Asahi/Nicastro commercial connections of the defendant to
the forum.154 Calder does not apply to “untargeted negligence”155 and does
require a case-by-case assessment of the intentional act in question to determine
if act was expressly aimed at the forum state.156 Although Calder was a libel
case,157 courts have recognized that “[t]he Supreme Court did not intend the
Calder ‘effects’ test to apply only to libel cases.”158 Given the unquestionable
condemnation of intentional misconduct indicated by Calder, courts should be
more inclined to protect their residents from the domestic harms arising from
such misconduct (even if the misconduct occurred abroad, particularly if no
other domestic forum is available for the resolution of their claims).159
Unfortunately, courts and commentators do not uniformly apply or understand
Calder-effects jurisdiction.160 For example, in Guidry v. United States Tobacco,
154. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90.
155. Id. at 789.
156. Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 2004); Imo Indus.,
Inc. v. Kiekart AG, 155 F. 3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Calder can be applied to a
variety of intentional torts).
157. 465 U.S. at 785.
158. Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986);
Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286–87 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wallace, 778 F.2d at
395); see also Emissive Energy Corp. v. SPA-Simrad, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 (D. R.I. 2011)
(“Although the Federal Circuit has yet to apply the ‘effects’ test in an ordinary patent infringement
suit, it has endorsed a broad application of personal jurisdiction under Calder.”).
159. This principal is recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
When the act was done with the intention of causing the particular effects in the state, the
state is likely to have judicial jurisdiction though the defendant has no other contact with
the state. This will almost surely be so when the effect involves injury to person or
damage to tangible property.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 cmt. e (1988 revision); see also Id. § 36 cmt.
c (1971) (“A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit
torts within its territory.”).
160. Compare Allred, 117 F.3d at 286 (“[T]he effects test is not a substitute for a nonresident’s
minimum contacts that demonstrate purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state.”), and
Brokerwood Prods. Int’l (U.S.), Inc. v. Cuisine Crotone, Inc., 104 F. App’x 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2004)
(declining to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant when the plaintiff had not alleged
evidence of intentionally aiming conduct at the forum state) with Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith,
384 F.3d 93, 96 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that under Calder “a party is subject to personal
jurisdiction in a state when his or her tortious actions were intentionally directed at that state and
those actions caused harm in that state”), and Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619,
628 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the
state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects
are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s
conduct.”).
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the court applied the Calder “effects” test and found that the commission of an
intentional tort by a nonresident “within the state, or an act outside the state that
causes tortious injury within the state . . . amounts to sufficient minimum
contacts within the state by the defendant to constitutionally permit courts within
that state, including federal courts, to exercise personal adjudicative jurisdiction
over the tortfeasor and the causes of actions arising from the offenses or quasioffenses.”161 Some courts have held that even a single intentional act giving rise
to injury in a forum state can be sufficient for a finding of minimum contacts
under Calder.162
But some courts have concluded that Calder-effects jurisdiction requires more
than one act and may not serve as a substitute for a finding of minimum contacts
demonstrating purposeful availment within the forum state.163 Professor
Cassandra Burke Robertson recently urged against an expansive reading of
Calder-effects jurisdiction.164 She noted that the Supreme Court “has not
revisited” Calder-effect jurisdiction since its original decision in 1984 and
questioned whether a misunderstanding of Calder could lead to circumvention
of basic procedural requirements established for in personam jurisdiction.165
She also referenced Nicastro, noting that the exception for intentional torts from
the purposeful availment requirement remains unclear, though reasonable minds
can differ on this point.166
B. Aiming and the Brunt
The most challenging aspect of applying Calder to a foreign manufacturer’s
theft of IP or IT, however, is how to address the express “aiming” requirement.
Under Calder, the acts of the defendant must have targeted or been aimed at the
forum state.167 Some years ago, the Second Circuit held that if a defendant has
“reason to believe” that its intentional misconduct would cause harm in a

161. 188 F.3d at 628; see also Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“[T]here can be no serious doubt after Calder v. Jones . . . that the state in which the victim of a
tort suffers the injury may entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor.”).
162. See Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999).
163. See MLS Nat’l Med. Evaluation Servs. v. Templin, 812 F. Supp. 2d 788, 799–800 (E.D.
Mich. 2011); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 804–05, 807 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citing Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)); KwikKopy Corp. v. Byers, 37 F. App’x 90, *5 (5th Cir. 2002).
164. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1356–57 (2012).
165. Id. at 1303, 1356.
166. Robertson, supra note 164, at 1303, 1340 (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion)) (noting the disagreement between various courts over
the exception for intentional tort cases).
167. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
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particular state, that might suffice to satisfy the aiming requirement in a Caldereffects case.168
The consequences of IT and IP theft are highly predictable. Products made
with stolen IP or IT have a lower cost of production and, therefore, have the
potential to artificially undercut costs incurred by, and prices offered by, a
company that respects property rights and uses legal IT in its operations.169 This
results in a market distortion and is harmful to both competitors who abide by
the rule of law and pay for their IT and IP and to competition generally because
it incentives firms—at the margins—to attempt to gain a competitive advantage
firms by investing greater resources into stealing IT and fewer resources into
innovation and product improvements.170 This will be true—and quite
foreseeable—in any state where goods made through IT or IP piracy enter the
stream of commerce. Whether recognition of this pernicious effect satisfies
Calder’s aiming requirement is unresolved.
In Calder, the fact that the source of the libel (the National Enquirer) had
large circulation in the state in which plaintiff Shirley Jones brought suit, was
sufficient for the Court to find that the defendant had “aimed” activity at
California or could anticipate being haled into court in that state.171 Using that
reasoning in the case of IT or IP theft, if goods produced by a foreign defendant
made with or using stolen IT or IP have significant sales in one state, the
defendant should anticipate being haled to court in that state. The problem is
that in many cases of IT or IP theft, the goods in question are sold in many
states.172 Does that mean there is Calder-effects jurisdiction in all states where
the product is sold—or only in those states where the sales are substantial?
Because the Supreme Court has not clarified the meaning of Calder, one can
only surmise what the outcome might be in any particular case.
Professor A. Benjamin Spencer explained that “perpetrators of intentional
torts can ‘anticipate being haled into court’ in the place where the targets of their
wrongful actions reside.”173 The Eleventh Circuit is one of the few circuits to
address the question of intentionality and aiming raised by Calder. In
Licciardello v. Lovelady, the court found that the Calder-effects test is focused
on the intentionality and purposefulness of the act directed at a specific
individual and not on the intention to have a specific effect in a particular

168. Chaiken v. VV Publ’g. Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that the
defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, because, among other
reasons, he did not have reason to believe that his conduct was aimed at the forum state).
169. See supra 10 and accompanying text.
170. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 6, at 3–4.
171. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784, 789–90.
172. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 7, at 5 (discussing the vast
magnitude of IT and IP theft).
173. A. Benjamin Spencer, Terminating Calder: “Effects” Based Jurisdiction in the Ninth
Circuit After Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 197, 202 (2004)
(quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 790).
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forum.174 Licciardiello suggests that it is perfectly reasonable to hale into court
a defendant who engages in intentional misconduct directed at an individual in
the forum state because it is a foreseeable consequence.175
The Calder opinion itself does not resolve the question of the extent to which
a defendant must aim its misconduct at a particular jurisdiction for personal
jurisdiction to attach.176 Instead, the court assumed that intentional misconduct
creates a separate category for the assessment of jurisdiction in intentional tort
cases without resolving the meaning of “express aiming.”177 Thus, not
surprisingly, opinions vary regarding the aiming requirement in Calder-effects
cases.178 In IMO Industries v. Kiekert, the court found that a forum state must
be the “focal point” of the defendant’s intentional misconduct to satisfy the
Calder-effects jurisdiction requirements.179 In reaching its decision, the Third
Circuit surveyed other circuits and found a similar interpretation in the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.180
An important contrast to IMO is Cole v. Tobacco Institute.181 In Cole, the
defendant, a non-U.S. tobacco company, evinced knowledge of potential
liability in the United States and employed personnel who knowingly
perpetuated fraud regarding the risks of tobacco use.182 Based on these
circumstances, the court implicitly rejected the notion of a precise focal point as
174. 544 F.3d 1280, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2008).
175. Id.; see also Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34
F.3d 410, 411, 412 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding the assertion of Calder-effects jurisdiction against a
Canadian defendant, a professional sports team, in a trademark infringement suit even though the
only contact with the forum state was the periodic broadcast of the team’s games because alleged
harm would be felt predominately in the forum state). However, some courts also require a
defendant to have knowledge that his action targets the forum state in order for a court in the forum
state to assert personal jurisdiction. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The
defendant must be chargeable with knowledge of the forum at which his conduct is directed in order
to reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum.”).
176. See Calder, 465 U.S. 789–90 (explaining that the defendant’s misconduct was clearly
aimed at the forum state, but failing to establish specific guidelines for subsequent determinations
of what constitutes “aiming”); see also Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that the commission of an intentional tort that had an effect in the forum state met
the requirements of Calder without additional documentation of contacts).
177. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d at 1087–88 (requiring
express aiming in addition to foreseeability of contact or harm).
178. See Stephen Blecha, Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: The Use of Calder
Jurisdiction in State Indirect Purchaser Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 895 (2012) (setting
out the varying positions on Calder’s express aiming requirement).
179. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998).
180. Id. at 261–63 (citing Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 1998); Esab Grp., Inc.
v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997), cert denied 523 U.S. 1048 (1998); Far W. Capital,
Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995); Gen. Electric Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d
1376 (8th Cir. 1993); and Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1998));
see also Blecha, supra note 178, at 895.
181. 47 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
182. Id. at 813, 816–17.
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a requirement for “express aiming,” holding instead that a defendant could not
escape the jurisdiction of the forum state court if its wrongdoing covered
multiple jurisdictions.183 The Cole court held that when a defendant’s
misconduct is aimed at the entire United States, there are sufficient minimum
contacts in every state in which the misconduct caused injury.184 Although the
case law on this point is limited, it makes little sense to allow a defendant to
avoid accountability anywhere on the premise that it caused multiple harms
everywhere.185
There is also a debate as to whether Calder-effects jurisdiction requires the
forum state to bear the “brunt” of the defendant’s misconduct.186 In Yahoo! v.
La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, the court determined that the
quantum of harm felt by the forum state was not the appropriate measure for the
sufficiency of contact in Calder-effects jurisdiction, holding that a forum state
can assert personal jurisdiction if it experienced some harm, “it does not matter
that even more harm might have been suffered in another state.”187 As other
courts have similarly recognized, it makes little sense to limit
Calder-effects jurisdiction solely to the forum in which the most harm is felt.188
Woven throughout the court’s discussion in Calder are the notions of notice
and foreseeability,189 both are central to the due process argument at the core of
the minimum contacts debate. Calder, like Asahi and Nicastro, posed the
question of whether it is fair to bring a defendant before a particular state’s court
based on the foreseeability that the defendant’s actions might cause harm to an
entity or an individual within that state.190 The Calder Court focused on a
183. See id. at 815–16.
184. Id.; Blecha, supra note 178, at 895. In reaching its decision, the Cole court referred to
Commonwealth v. Phillip Morris. Cole, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 815–16 (citing Commonwealth v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., No. 957378, 1998 WL 1181992, at *25–26 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 1998)). In this
case, the court interpreted Calder as follows: under Calder, the fact that [the defendant] aimed its
alleged wrongdoing at the entire United States gives it the requisite ‘minimum contacts’ with each
state where that alleged intentional wrongdoing caused injury. Phillip Morris, 1998 WL 1181992,
at *26.
185. See Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here can be no
serious doubt after Calder v. Jones . . . that the state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury
may entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor.” (citations omitted)).
186. Blecha, supra note 178, at 895; see Calder, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
187. 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006).
188. See, e.g., Weather Underground, Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Sys., Inc., No. 09-10756,
2011 WL 1120106, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2011) (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 791) (“The Court
rejects the notion that for purposes of the Calder effects test, the brunt of the injury must occur at
the ‘nerve center.’ Calder does not require that the harm occur at the principal place of business,
merely that the tortious conduct was ‘calculated to cause injury. . . .’”); id. (“To credit Defendant’s
argument, the Court has to conclude that a corporation can only suffer effects in one location. That
cannot be the case.”); see also Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 2007); Yahoo! v. La
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006).
189. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90.
190. See id.; Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the Wrong Target: The ‘Audience Targeting’ Test
for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 546–47 (2012).
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defendant’s capacity to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” as a
consequence of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.191 In the case of
the use of stolen IP or IT by foreign manufacturers that export to the United
States, an effect on competition and on competitors within any state in which
their products are sold is not only foreseeable, it is inevitable.
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in Nicastro made clear that if numerous
jurisdictions experience a defendant’s misconduct, courts in any of those
jurisdictions ought to be able to protect the citizens by exercising in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant.192 Calder-effects jurisdiction allows just that
outcome and does not violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”193 Due process concerns decrease if the defendant reasonably
anticipates being “haled into court.”194
While Calder-effects jurisdiction holds out potential for both IT and IP
owners whose products are stolen and competitors who are adversely affected
by such theft, conflicting views on what the case allows and requires also render
Calder potentially problematic as a primary source of justice for victims of IT
and IP theft.195 The jurisdictional puzzle of Asahi, compounded by the multiple
opinions in Nicastro and the varying interpretations of Calder, render state and
federal courts unreliable fora to resolve such claims.196 How then can the legal
system protect the competitive market or the interests of the owners of IT and
IP? Two potential approaches are (1) state enforcement of unfair trade and
unfair competition laws and (2) a federal enforcement action or the issuances of
rules or guidelines.
V. A BEGINNING: THE FIRST TWO (OF HOPEFULLY MANY) STATE UNFAIR
COMPETITION CASES AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FTC ACTION
In December 2012, Ankur Kapoor reported on the problem of IT theft in the
December 2012 ABA Antitrust Newletter.197 He cited a study that estimating

191. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980).
192. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2804 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
193. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
194. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
195. See supra Part IV.
196. See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (stating that Nicastro “is a
disaster” and, at best, the Court “performed miserably”); Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical
Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 341, 345 (2012) (noting that Nicastro “exacerbated rather than ameliorated the
doctrinal confusion” and revealed “a disappointing level of judicial competence”).
197. Ankur Kapoor, Deterring IT Theft in Manufacturing Will Spur Innovation and Growth,
A.B.A SEC. ANTITRUST L.–ST. ENFORCEMENT COMMITTEE, Fall 2012, 10–11.
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that over $60 billion of IT is stolen annually.198 Kapoor characterized IT theft
as “rampant” and the effects of such theft as “consequential.”199 He
acknowledged the value in action by state attorneys generals or a federal
regulatory agency as means of combatting unfair competition resulting form IT
theft.200 Kapoor suggests that IT theft followed by sales of products derived
from such stolen property would be within Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and would be sufficient to allow the FTC to take action against
the foreign entities. 201 Thus far, the FTC has taken no direct action.
State attorneys general, on the other hand, have begun to respond. As Kapoor
notes, in November 2011 eighty percent of the attorneys general in the United
States signed a petition urging the FTC to take action designed to deter foreign
manufacturers from using stolen IT,202 and in two states, unfair trade or unfair
competition cases have been initiated against foreign manufacturers.203
A. State Unfair Trade
The first public state unfair trade case targeting stolen IP and IT was filed in
fall 2012 by the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Massachusetts
against Narong Seafood Company pursuant to Massachusetts General Law 93A
which prohibits unfair competition.204 The Massachusetts Attorney General
alleged that Narong used pirated IT to produce goods in Thailand that were then
exported to the United States and sold in Massachusetts.205 The Massachusetts
Attorney General declared that the use of unlicensed software in these
circumstances was an unfair method of competition that provided Narong with
an unfair advantage over businesses operating in Massachusetts that pay for their
software.206 Rather than fighting the claim, Narong settled, paying a $10,000
civil fine and agreeing to cease using unlicensed or stolen IT or IP in conjunction
with the manufacture or sale of its products.207 In a statement issued after the
case was settled, Attorney General Coakely stated that “[b]usinesses using
198. Id. at 10 (citing BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SHADOW MARKET: 2011 BSA GLOBAL
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (9th ed. 2012), available at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2011).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 10–11.
201. Id. at 10 (referencing Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)).
202. Id.; Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys. Gen. to the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Nov. 4, 2011),
available
at
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/FTCA%20Enforcement%20
Final.PDF.
203. See infra notes 204–219 and accompanying text (discussing cases filed in Massachusetts
and California against foreign entities who allegedly used stolen IT to fabricate products).
204. See Press Release, Attorney Gen. of Mass. Martha Coakley, Co. Fined for Using Pirated
Software to Gain Unfair Advantage Over Mass. Bus. (Oct. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/2012-10-18-narong-seafood
-co.html.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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unlicensed software should not gain an unfair cost advantage over rivals who
play by the rules.”208
In January 2013, California initiated two similar cases, State v. Ningbo
Beyond Home Textile,209 and State v. Pratibha Syntex.210 California Attorney
General Kamala D. Harris warned that “[c]ompanies across the globe should be
on notice that they will be held accountable in California for stealing our
intellectual property.”211 The Office of the California Attorney General issued
a press release emphasizing that suits of this nature are essential to protect the
interests of IP and IT owners, the competitive market, and the State of California,
which has lost 400,000 jobs and $1.6 billion as a result of the IP and IT piracy.212
The contentions in the Ningbo complaint are direct and powerful. The
complaint alleges that foreign IT and IP theft give producers “a critical
short-term advantage over their American competitors by not paying licensing
fees to software developers.”213 The actions “can stunt the development of . . .
software” and thus flatten innovation and efficiency by U.S. technology
providers and U.S. producers and sellers.214 Deprived of this competitive
advantage, American companies may opt to downsize and move overseas, which
would result in the permanent loss of jobs throughout the United States.215
Consistent with the positions taken in this Article, the Ningbo complaint notes
that, “state laws, federal laws, and international treaties do not address the
pernicious downstream effects of such piracy.”216 The State asserted in the
Ningbo complaint that the solution to this problem should be to deem foreign
entities’ use of stolen IT or IP an unfair method of competition.217 Given the
present insufficiency of private remedies, the Ningbo case could establish a
format for accountability.
The remedy suggested in the Ningbo case is available to Attorneys General
throughout the country, as nearly every state has unfair trade and unfair
competition laws that encompass the wrongs alleged in the California and
Massachusetts proceedings.218 State unfair competition laws apply to stolen
208. Id.
209. See Complaint, State v. Ningbo Beyond Home Textile Co., No. BC 499771 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2013) [hereinafter Ningbo Complaint].
210. Complaint, State v. Pratibha Syntex Ltd., No. BC 499751 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2013).
211. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. Kamala D. Harris Files Unfair Competition
Lawsuits Over Use of Pirated Software in Apparel Indus., Jan. 24, 2013, available at
http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-files-unfair-competition
-lawsuits-over-use.
212. Id.
213. Ningbo Complaint, supra note 209, at ¶¶ 5–6.
214. Id. at ¶ 6.
215. Id. at ¶ 7.
216. Id. at ¶ 8.
217. Id.
218. See Krista Correa, All Your Face Are Belong To Us: Protecting Celebrity Images in
Hyper-Realistic Video Games, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 93, 107–108 (2011); See, e.g.,
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property and to circumstances where the competitive market is distorted and the
pricing structure compromised by unlawful acts. In light of the prevalence of
such laws, foreign producers relying on stolen IT and IP (as well as domestic
sellers aware of the theft) can hardly claim to be surprised by a state’s pursuit of
legal recourse.
Although defendants might seek to skirt liability because of the complexity
and uncertainty generated by the in personam jurisdiction cases, Asahi and
Nicastro, discussed in this work, state enforcement actions targeting one or more
aspects of foreign supply chains are a vital and legitimate alternative approach
to the problem.219 These state enforcement cases seek to provide statewide
protection for fair competition, innovation, creativity, and invention, and
hopefully will sidestep some of the problems presented for IT and IP theft
victims by the Asahi and Nicastro decisions.220 As a Nevada court noted some
years ago in a case against the rock band Judas Priest, states have a strong
interest in protecting their citizens, therefore, jurisdiction over a foreign entity
that has knowingly developed a global market is proper when harm in the state
results from the entity’s actions.221
It hardly seems controversial to recognize that states have an interest in
protecting their own citizens.222 But because Massachusetts and California are
among the first states to enforce unfair trade or unfair competition statutes in IT
and IP theft cases, it remains to be seen whether the broad interests of a state, as
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 37-24-1 (2004 & Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104
(2001 & Supp. 2012); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 13-5a-103, 13-5-17, 13-11-4 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453
(2006 & Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200 (2006 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.86.020 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-104 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 100.20 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105 (2011).
219. Some of the materials that follow are based on and draw from my earlier article, Andrew
Popper, Beneficiaries of Misconduct: A Direct Approach to IT Theft, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 27 (2013).
220. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law From Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 815, 848–49 (2009) (“U.S. domestic laws, applied extraterritorially, are now routinely used
to influence international policy.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in
Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 592–96 (1997).
221. Judas Priest v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev., 760 P.2d 137, 139 (Nev.
1988) (explaining that it was “equitable” for Judas Priest’s band members to defend against a
lawsuit in a foreign country because the band “consciously and deliberately chose to develop a
world-wide market”).
222. See Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d
1040, 1048 (Colo. 1980) (recognizing the importance of “the plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief,” and explaining that not only would it be difficult for the plaintiffs
to attempt to litigate abroad, but that “this state has an interest in providing a forum to its citizens
injured by the alleged tortious conduct of nonresidents” (emphasis added)); State v. NV Sumatra
Tobacco Trading Company, 666 S.E.2d 218, 223 (S.C. 2008) (holding that “[t]he exercise of
jurisdiction over [defendant] Sumatra [was] reasonable and fair . . . [because] the State’s interest in
exercising jurisdiction outweighs any . . . inconvenience” caused by requiring the defendant to
defend the case in the United States (emphasis added)).
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a complainant, will be accorded a more expansive reading of the in personam
cases jurisprudence discussed in this Article.
Although foreign producers and sellers who use stolen IT in their business
operations might find a safe haven in the jurisprudential chaos that comes in the
wake of the Nicastro decision, they should be held accountable for their
misconduct. State unfair trade and unfair competition laws can serve that
function.223 These laws have the potential to deter misconduct throughout the
supply chain,224 even if they may not uniformly provide a meaningful private
remedy.225 That said, simple notions of fairness suggest that “one who has used
his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a commercial product
should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to ‘reap what he
has not sown.’”226 By the public implementation and enforcement of these
statutes, private victims gain, at a minimum, the downstream benefits of a
vibrant competitive market environment.227 Some states conceive of these
claims broadly,228 while others do not.229 Thus far, the potential for private

223. For example, regular use of stolen goods to gain an unfair competitive advantage over
those who abide by the law falls within the scope of a North Carolina law prohibiting “[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.” See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2011). Similarly, Iowa and Missouri both
prohibit “unfair practices” in an effort to preserve and protect the competitive market. See IOWA
CODE ANN. § 714.16(2)(a) (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.020(1) (West 2011) (focused on
fraud and misrepresentation).
224. Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALBANY L. REV. 181, 181, 202 (2011)
(“To claim that punishment has no effect on other market participants is to deny our collective
experience. . . . Money approximates loss and covers expenses. It can alter financial possibilities
and provide remedial potential. Justice requires more: the avoidance of similar harms, or
deterrence.”).
225. See Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance: The
Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-Business Transactions, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 81, n.45 (2003) (discussing private right of action and noting that forty-eight states provide
for a private right of action, but explaining that states have different specifications for who can
assert the right). Texas is one of the states that provides a private right of action. See TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 2011).
226. Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the
Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 595, 612 (1942).
227. Miguel Deutch, Unfair Competition and the “Misappropriation Doctrine” a Renewed
Analysis, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 503, 545 (2004) (evoking the free rider problem); see also Kenney
v. Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc., 269 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that
the field of unfair competition has been expanded to protect the skills and labor of competitors).
228. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The
law of unfair competition is the umbrella for all statutory and nonstatutory causes of action arising
out of business conduct which is contrary to honest practice in industrial or commercial matters”);
Rehab. Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 305–06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (describing
unfair competition broadly as “a general category of torts which courts recognize for the protection
of commercial interests”).
229. Constance A. Anastopoulo, Bad Faith: Building a House of Straw, Sticks, or Bricks, 42
U. MEM. L. REV. 687, 690 (2012) (“most states do not permit a private right of action under their
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claims related to IT and IP theft based on current case law, outside of cases
brought by state attorneys general, has not substantially slowed down the rate of
foreign piracy.230 The significant cost of investigation at home and abroad,
litigation costs, and the complexities associated with enforcement of judgments
place this option beyond the reach of most victims. In contrast, public unfair
trade cases can address a whole range of misconduct, harness the resources of a
state attorney general, and do not require a showing of a personal harm.231
Although the meaning of unfair competition varies, theft of IT and IP is clearly
illegal under any conception of the term.232 Moreover, once the issue is properly
before a court in an unfair trade case, there is a good argument that the court has
the power to provide the victim with a remedy, even if a foreign defendant
committed the wrong.233 Similarly, it is arguable that remedies can be confined
to property or interests in the forum state only.234
B. The Federal Trade Commission
Another approach for dealing with stolen IP or IT and its effects on U.S.
commerce would be for the FTC pursue this profoundly unfair method of
competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which condemns “[u]nfair methods
of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”235 This legislation
[unfair competition or unfair trade] statutes”); Flynn & Slate, supra note 225, at 87–88 (explaining
that some state limit who can take advantage of their unfair trade statutes).
230. See C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine:
Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 63 (1987); Courtney
W. Franks, Comment, Analyzing the Urge to Merge: Conversion of Intangible Property and the
Merger Doctrine in the Wake of Kremen v. Cohen, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 489, 522 (2005); Rob Calia,
Increase in IP Seizures Demonstrates Scope of Global Counterfeiting and Piracy, GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL
(Jan.
10,
2012),
http://globalipcenter.com/increase-ip-seizures
-demonstrates-scope-global-counterfeiting-and-piracy/ (noting that seizures of pirated goods have
increased 325 percent over the past decade).
231. See supra notes 204–30 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 403 S.E.2d 104, 109 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(“No precise definition of ‘unfair methods of competition’ . . . exists. . . . ‘Rather, the fair or unfair
nature of particular conduct is to be judged . . . against the background of actual human experience
and by determining its intended and actual effects upon others.’”) (quoting McDonald v. Scarboro,
370 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)); see also State ex rel. Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines
Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Iowa 2005) (“What is an ‘unfair practice’? On its face
the term is dizzying in its generality. . . . [C]ourts have determined statutes that prohibit ‘unfair
practices’ are designed to infuse flexible equitable principles into consumer protection law so that
it may respond to the myriad of unscrupulous business practices modern consumers face.”).
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1971) (“A state has power to
exercise judicial jurisdiction to order a person, who is subject to its judicial jurisdiction, to do an
act, or to refrain from doing an act, in another state.”).
234. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 48, cmt. c (1995) (“[A]lthough a
court may have jurisdiction to grant broader relief, an injunction protecting the right of publicity
should ordinarily be limited to conduct in jurisdictions that provide protection comparable to the
forum state.”).
235. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
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gives the FTC the power to “consider[] public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.”236
Those values certainly include condemning theft of IT and IP as unfair, whether
by committed by foreign or domestic entities. Moreover, the enforcement power
of the FTC extends beyond domestic borders if the foreign action “ha[s] a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. markets.237
The FTC could also conduct a rulemaking designed to create standards for
supply chain review by domestic sellers or, issue informal guidelines
establishing criteria to clarify the obligations borne by domestic importers and
sellers to determine if foreign providers are relying on stolen IP or IT.238
Alternatively, the FTC could initiate enforcement actions, targeting domestic
sellers, importers, or foreign entities that sell products manufactured by
companies that use stolen IT or IP in their business operations.239 Bringing such
enforcement actions would be particularly justified with respect to
manufacturers located in jurisdictions in which a meaningful remedy for IT theft
would be difficult to obtain in the local courts.
In order to carry out their legislative mandate, federal agencies must
occasionally reach beyond the territorial United States in order to protect
domestic interests and ensure accountability.240 To turn a blind eye to practices
that cost U.S. entities hundreds of billions of dollars each year borders on
abdication. At a bare minimum, issuing “best practices” standards or
guidelines—both of which can be done relatively easy and cheaply, would be a
step in the right direction and would send a powerful message to foreign IT and
IP thieves.
The White House recently released a substantial report on the problem of IT
and IP theft.241 The report was developed with the input from the Departments
236. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A); see Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and
Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 809, 821 (2011).
238. See Serge Mezhburd, The Unintelligible Standard: Rethinking the Mandate of the FTC
from a Nondelegation Perspective, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 361, 366–72 (2000) (explaining
the history and mechanics of FTC rulemaking power).
239. See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58) (providing the FTC power to secure injunctive relief against those who are
engaged in unfair or deceptive act). But nothing in the Act allows for individual claims by the
victims of the misconduct.
240. See S.E.C. v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Although it might not
be convenient for Defendants to defend this action in the United States, Defendants have not made
a particular showing that the burden on them would be ‘severe’ or ‘gravely difficult.’ . . . [I]f the
SEC could not enforce the FCPA against Defendants in federal courts in the United States,
Defendants could potentially evade liability altogether.”); S.E.C. v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign entities).
241. See U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (2012) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_mar2012.pdf.
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of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, and the Treasury, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative and the
U.S. Copyright Office.242 Notably, the FTC was not involved. The report urges
the establishment of mechanisms to secure supply chains and recites the
accomplishments of various domestic and transnational entities that have
addressed the problem.243 This report indicates that the substantial federal
resources have been committed and appears to invite the FTC to engage in the
effort.
VI. LOOKING FORWARD
Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently examined the problems with in
personam jurisdiction generated by both the Nicastro case and its companion,
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation v. Brown.244 After noting the failure of the
Court to craft meaningful guidance to deal with international defendants in
product liability cases, Professor Simpson-Wood noted that one can only hope
that in the future the Court will adopt “a more expansive view of general
jurisdiction.”245 She suggests that stream of distribution or stream of commerce
theories should suffice “sans the minimum contact analysis.”246
Like Nicastro, Goodyear failed to simplify the problem of holding
accountable foreign entities whose misconduct has a pernicious effect on and
negative consequences for the United States economy.247 If anything, Goodyear
rendered the task of plaintiffs who are victims of foreign IT or IP theft more
difficult by “clarifying that the overly complicated stream of commerce theory
of personal jurisdiction does not apply to general in personam jurisdiction
analysis.”248 Even when confronting egregious misconduct, including alleged
overt human rights violations, the Court has seemed unwilling to declare United
States courts a friendly forum for foreign defendants.249
Another commentator, Professor Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, is likewise
critical of the Court’s failure to provide guidance on legal standards or relief to
242. Id. at 1.
243. Id. at 18–20.
244. Simpson-Wood, supra note 19, at 154–57 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
245. Id. at 155–56.
246. Id. at 156.
247. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851–54. In Goodyear, the plaintiff was killed in a bus
accident in France. Id. at 2851. The plaintiff’s parents alleged that the accident was the result of a
defect in the bus’s tires, which were produced by defendant Goodyear in North Carolina and then
sold primarily for use outside the United States. Id. at 2851–52. The tires were not sold in North
Carolina. Id. at 2852. The Court found that “the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is . . . one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Id. at 2853–54.
248. S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear,
McIntyre, and the Ship of Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 547, 550 (2011).
249. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (limiting the
application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to individuals, giving corporations a free ride).
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those who are victims of misconduct by foreign entities.250 Rhodes characterizes
the Court’s decisions in Nicastro and Goodyear as overly formalistic and
accuses the Court of using a fictional basis for jurisdictional limitations that
frustrates the interests of those legitimately entitled to relief in the United
States.251 Rhodes notes that the Court has long rejected the notion of “doing
business” as a basis for jurisdiction,252 perhaps necessitating legislative action
to address the deeply problematic uncertainties in the field.253
A Note in the Fordham Law Review recently observed: “In a global economy,
where a manufacturer produces machines hoping to sell them in as many places
as possible, it is not unfair to subject that manufacturer to suit in a place where
it hopes, but does not necessarily anticipate, to do business.”254 The logic and
fairness behind this position is clear. As one court noted: “In this age of NAFTA
and GATT one can expect further globalization of commerce, and it is only
reasonable for companies that distribute allegedly defective products through
regional distributors in this country to anticipate being haled into court by
plaintiffs in their home states.”255 Unfortunately, that reasoning does not appear
in Asahi, Nicastro, or Goodyear.
Additionally, Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue recently wrote about
Nicastro and Goodyear, finding the Court sharply divided on critical
jurisdictional questions.256 Looking at the opinions of Justice Kennedy and
Justice Ginsberg in Nicastro, Dean Perdue characterizes the assertions in both
opinions regarding jurisdiction to be simply incorrect.257 She argues that Justice
Kennedy’s position in Nicastro “suggests that Kennedy believes that defendants
have a liberty interest in not being subject to the governmental authority of the
state with which they have not affirmatively affiliated themselves.”258 She
further notes that “Kennedy apparently believes that states have no power or
authority separate than what is conferred by the defendant.”259 This position
takes “party autonomy” to a new and troubling level. Although courts have long
recognized that parties may agree to apply the law of a particular state when

250. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a
Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 388–90 (2012).
251. See id. at 433–34.
252. Id. at 430 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957)) (“In a continuing
process of evolution this Court accepted and then abandoned ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ and
‘presence’ as the standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over such corporations.”).
253. Id. at 435.
254. Peter R. Bryce, Note, Whither Fairness? In Search of a Jurisdictional Test After J
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2975, 3006 (2012) (citations omitted).
255. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (8th Cir. 1994).
256. See Perdue, supra note 14, at 729.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 741.
259. Id.
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entering into a contract, the options do not include selecting no law, no state, and
no accountability.260
Assuming the Supreme Court is disinclined to back away from Nicastro,
unwilling to adopt Justice Brennan’s stream-of-commerce approach, and
unlikely to revisit Calder to clarify the unresolved aiming issues, one remaining
option is to enact federal legislation that provides injured parties better access to
U.S. courts. A legislative solution is fair, constitutional, and necessary.261
Whether such legislation has a political future is another question. The last
time a bill was submitted to address these problems, it died without ever coming
to the floor of the House.262 However, legislation is a promising solution and
response to Justice O’Connor’s invitation in Asahi: “Congress could, consistent
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court
personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national
contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in
which the federal court sits.”263
VII. CONCLUSION
Hope for a viable and reliable theory for victims of IT and IP theft after
Nicastro and Goodyear seems faint at best. It is hard to see another way to read
cases like Nicastro, leaving most victims of overt IT and IP theft without a clear
path to secure justice in the courts, outside the reading of Calder suggested
earlier. Public enforcement or regulatory action at the state or federal level can
sanction those engaged in such misconduct and sends a clear message regarding
the public will to address the problem.
In the absence of federal legislation, protection of basic property rights must
be accomplished through state unfair trade enforcement actions along the lines
260. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1972). Party autonomy is not without
its critics. Compare William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and
Those It Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 33–34 (2006),
with Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise,
67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 66 (1992) (reviewing the “strong sense of the importance of party autonomy”
evident in Supreme Court cases).
261. See Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act: Hearing on H.R. 4678 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th
Cong. 41 (2010) (statement of Andrew F. Popper, Professor of Law, American University,
Washington College of Law) (testifying that the proposed legislation was “a strong bill that is
constitutionally sound, beneficial to consumers, beneficial to U.S. businesses, and consistent with
the domestic laws and practices of many of our major trading partners. It levels the civil liability
landscape, stripping foreign manufacturers of an unfair advantage. It addresses a powerful but
understandable loophole in our legal system, facilitating access to the courts by injured consumers.
By making possible litigation against those who place into the stream of commerce dangerous,
defective, and even deadly goods, the bill triggers corrective justice incentive mechanisms of the
tort system. When you create the realistic possibility for liability, you activate incentives to make
safer and more efficient products.”).
262. Rhodes, supra note 250, at 434–35.
263. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n* (1987) (plurality opinion).
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of the Massachusetts and California proceedings discussed in this Article or FTC
action. These avenues must be pursued and widened. Governmental initiatives
of this type will stimulate innovation, creativity, and invention while producing
incentives for efficiency. They will also have a stabilizing effect on the
competitive market. Finally, they can help avoid the loss of another trillion
dollars in the next decade.
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